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Abstract 
Can people consistently attempt to falsify, that is, search for 
refuting evidence, when testing the truth of hypotheses? 
Experimental evidence indicates that people tend to search for 
confirming evidence. We report two novel experiments that 
show that people can consistently falsify when it is the only 
helpful strategy. Experiment 1 showed that participants 
readily falsified somebody else’s hypothesis. Their task was 
to test a hypothesis belonging to an ‘imaginary participant’ 
and they knew it was a low quality hypothesis. Experiment 2 
showed that participants were able to falsify a low quality 
hypothesis belonging to an imaginary participant more readily 
than their own low quality hypothesis. The results have 
important implications for theories of hypothesis testing and 
human rationality.  
Hypothesis Testing and Falsification 
People generate hypotheses to explain the workings of the 
world around them. They generate hypotheses in everyday 
social inference as well as in expert domains of scientific 
inquiry. The human ability to generate hypotheses has led to 
the accumulation of scientific knowledge. But it is the 
ability to test whether or not these hypotheses correspond to 
the evidence that leads to a true understanding. 
Experimental psychologists and epistemological 
philosophers have long sought to understand how people 
test their hypotheses (e.g., Popper, 1959; Wason, 1960; 
Kuhn, 1962). The key research questions have been: what is 
the best way to test hypotheses; how can people be 
successful hypothesis testers; and do people sometimes 
employ faulty hypothesis testing methods?  
To address these questions cognitive psychologists 
borrowed the crucial concepts of confirmation and 
falsification from the philosophy of science. Hypothesis 
testing was categorized either as confirming, that is, people 
search for evidence that is consistent with a hypothesis, or 
falsifying, that is, people search for evidence that is 
inconsistent with a hypothesis.  No matter how much 
evidence confirms a theory, there is never absolute certainty 
that it is correct (Popper, 1959). But if a major prediction of 
a theory is proved false, it can be inferred that the theory is 
incorrect,  or at least incomplete. Falsification can safeguard 
against having numerous theories that explain the same 
phenomenon, each with some confirming evidence. 
Theories that are falsified can be abandoned because they no 
longer offer the best explanations. For this reason,  the 
attempt to falsify, that is, to search for refuting evidence, has 
been advocated as the best way to test the truth of 
hypotheses. Nonetheless the merits of falsification have 
been questioned.  
Problems for Falsification  
Recent evidence indicates that people find falsification 
psychologically difficult and unhelpful (Poletiek, 1996; 
2001). Experimental studies in the psychological literature 
have shown that people are rarely capable of falsification, if 
indeed they find it possible at all (Poletiek, 1996). Early 
studies found that people tended overwhelmingly to confirm 
their hypotheses. They searched for evidence that was 
consistent with their hypothesis and they avoided 
inconsistent evidence. The tendency was termed 
confirmation bias (e.g., Wason, 1960). Their failure to 
attempt to falsify was interpreted as a failure to think 
rationally.  
   Even great scientists appear to exhibit a confirmation bias, 
as studies of the Apollo moon mission scientists testify (e.g., 
Mitroff, 1974). The hypotheses of these scientists have 
stood the test of time, perhaps indicating that they were high 
quality hypotheses with little chance of falsification in the 
first place. People may find confirmation to be useful. In 
fact,  attempts to confirm may be a better strategy  than 
attempts to falsify,  depending on the relationship between 
the hypothesis and the general principle to be discovered 
(Klayman & Ha, 1987). What then is the purpose of 
falsification? We suggest that a major purpose of 
falsification is to identify low quality hypotheses so that 
they can be abandoned. For example, chess masters have 
been shown to search for opponent moves that can falsify 
their plans, which helps them to discover that the moves 
they initially hypothesize to be good ones are mistaken 
(Cowley & Byrne, 2004).  
In this paper we outline the results of two experiments 
that show that people can find falsification to be consistently 
possible and helpful. The experiments were carried out 
using Wason’s 2-4-6 task. This task is a standard test bed 
for theories of hypothesis testing. The task presents a well-
defined hypothesis testing situation for which the 
relationship between a hypothesis and the available 
evidence is precisely worked out (e.g., Klayman & Ha, 
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1987). In addition it has a well-defined logic for classifying 
confirming and falsifying hypothesis testing.  
First we outline the logical properties of the task. Second 
we review some of the critical evidence from the task that 
has led researchers to question the usefulness of falsification 
(Klayman & Ha, 1987; Poletiek, 1996). Finally, we report a 
version of the task that we have designed that provides 
hypothesis testing situations in which participants must 
falsify in order to discover the truth—the ‘imaginary 
participant’ 2-4-6 task. We describe two experiments that 
address the question of whether or not people can falsify a 
hypothesis when it is rational to do so, that is, when the 
hypothesis is untrue.  
The 2-4-6 Task 
Wason (1960) first empirically investigated people’s 
hypothesis testing using the 2-4-6 task. Participants were 
instructed to discover a rule the experimenter had in mind 
that the number triple 2-4-6 conforms to. The participant is 
analogous to the scientist and the experimenter’s rule is 
analogous to the law of nature to be discovered.  
Participants are asked to discover the rule by generating 
their own number triples. For each triple they are told ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ by the experimenter as to whether or not it conforms 
to the rule or not. Each triple is taken to be a test of what the 
participant hypothesizes the rule to be. For example, 
participants tend to focus on the salient features of the 2-4-6 
triple and generate hypotheses such as ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’. They propose triples such as 10-12-14 
and 16-18-20. For each one of these triples they receive a 
‘yes’ response from the experimenter. But the 
experimenter’s rule is the deliberately general rule,  ‘any 
ascending numbers’. Hence, a triple such as 10-12-14 
receives a ‘yes’ because it is consistent with the rule to be 
discovered (‘any ascending numbers’) as well as the 
hypothesis under test (‘even numbers ascending in twos’). 
When each participant thinks they have discovered the rule 
they have to announce what they think it is. Typically 
participants announce an incorrect rule such as ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’. Only 21% of participants 
announced the correct rule first time round (Wason, 1960). 
This result has been replicated many times (e.g., Tweney et 
al., 1980). The tendency for people to seek out information 
consistent with their hypotheses and avoid inconsistent 
information was termed confirmation bias. We turn now to 
the logic of classifying confirming and falsifying tests in the 
task. 
The Logic of Hypothesis Testing in the 2-4-6 Task 
Initial classifications of hypothesis testing as confirming 
and falsifying tests were equated with positive tests (tests 
that were consistent with the participant’s hypothesis) and 
negative tests (tests that were inconsistent with the 
participant’s hypothesis) respectively (Wason, 1960). For 
example, when a participant’s hypothesis is ‘numbers 
ascending in twos’ and they generate the test triple 3-5-7, it 
is clear that 3-5-7 is consistent with the participant’s 
hypothesis because it is ascending in twos. This test is a 
positive test. But the classification must also take account of 
the intention of the hypothesis tester (Wetherick, 1962). The 
positive test described is a confirming test only if the 
participant intends the triple to conform to the 
experimenter’s rule. If the participant expects a ‘yes’ from 
the experimenter, they are attempting to confirm their 
hypothesis, and they expect their hypothesis is correct. But 
if the participant expects a ‘no’ from the experimenter, they 
are attempting to falsify their hypothesis and they expect 
their hypothesis is incorrect (Poletiek, 1996). Positive tests 
can be intended to either confirm or falsify. 
The same is true for negative tests. For example, when a 
participant’s hypothesis is ‘numbers ascending in twos’ and 
they generate the test triple 5-10-15, it is clear that 5-10-15 
is inconsistent with the participant’s hypothesis because it is 
not ascending in twos. This test is a negative test. However, 
it is a falsifying test only if the participant intends the triple 
to conform to the experimenter’s rule. If the participant 
expects a ‘yes’ from the experimenter, then they expect a 
triple that is inconsistent with their hypothesis to be 
consistent with the experimenter’s rule, and so they expect 
their hypothesis to be incorrect. But, if the participant 
expects a ‘no’ from the experimenter, then they are in fact 
attempting to confirm. They expect that the triple 5-10-15 is 
inconsistent with their hypothesis ‘numbers ascending in 
twos’ and they also expect that it is inconsistent with the 
experimenter’s rule. The negative test in this instance is 
intended to provide confirmation. Negative tests can be 
intended to either confirm or falsify. These four sorts of 
tests are considered the best classification scheme for 
confirming and falsifying hypothesis tests in the 2-4-6 task 
(e.g., Poletiek, 1996). Table 1 below shows an example of 
each of the four test types for the low quality hypothesis,  
‘even numbers ascending in twos’.  
 
Table 1:  Confirming and falsifying test types in  
the 2-4-6 task for the hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending 
in twos’.  
 
                          Positive or       Expect to  
       Test           negative           conform to  
       triple           test                   rule 
   _____________________________________________ 
 
   Confirming 
 Positive         8-10-12      positive             yes 
 Negative      23-25-27      negative             no 
 
   Falsifying 
 Positive        24-26-28      positive             no 
 Negative       5-10-15        negative           yes 
    _____________________________________________ 
  
Are people able to falsify their hypotheses, that is, do they 
generate negative falsifying tests? A participant who tests 
the low quality hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in 
twos’ attempts to falsify only if they generate a negative test 
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triple such as 5-10-15,  and they expect it to conform to the 
experimenter’s rule. If they receive the feedback that the 
triple is consistent with the experimenter’s rule, then they 
know their hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ is 
untrue. The ability to generate negative falsifying tests is 
pivotal to the debate about whether people can falsify in a 
useful way.   
Negative confirming tests may have been misidentified  
as falsifying tests in early studies of hypothesis testing. In 
one study participants were given the standard 2-4-6 task 
and they had to come up with their best guess about what 
the experimenter’s rule was. They were presented with the 
number triple 2-4-6 and the experimenter’s rule was the 
usual ‘any ascending numbers’ rule (Poletiek, 1996). 
Participants were given instructions either to ‘test’, 
‘confirm’,  or ‘falsify’. For the ‘test’ and ‘confirm’ 
conditions, the majority of tests fell into the positive 
confirming category (86% and 80% respectively),  and few 
tests fell into the negative falsifying category (0% and 3% 
respectively). Participants in the ‘falsify’ condition were 
instructed to ‘try to test in such a way as to get your 
hypothesis about the rule rejected’ (Poletiek, 1996; p.454). 
The majority of tests in this condition fell into the two 
confirming categories, the positive confirming and negative 
confirming categories (32% and 54% respectively). 
Although the participants proposed test triples that were 
negative tests, in fact they intended them to confirm. It was 
concluded that people do not seem to be able to make sense 
of falsification.  
In our experiments we have examined whether people 
naturally tend to falsify their hypotheses in some situations 
(Cowley and Byrne, 2005). For example, a teacher who 
knows a student’s hypothesis is incorrect may provide a 
counterexample to it. A scientist who believes another 
scientist’s hypothesis is incorrect may design an experiment 
to falsify it. In the experiments we describe, we tested 
whether people can readily falsify low-quality hypotheses 
that have been generated by others. Existing evidence 
indicates that participants can understand the value of 
negative falsifying tests of a hypothesis when the tests are 
generated by somebody else (Kareev & Halberstadt, 1993). 
Our question is the opposite: can participants generate 
negative falsifying tests when the hypothesis has been 
produced by somebody else? We constructed a version of 
the 2-4-6 task in which participants tested someone else’s 
hypothesis rather than their own.   
The ‘Imaginary Participant’ 2-4-6 Task 
We constructed an ‘imaginary participant’ version of the 2-
4-6 task in which participants were told that an individual 
called Peter was asked to discover a rule that an 
experimenter had in mind,  which the triple 2-4-6 conforms 
to (for details see Cowley and Byrne, 2005). The 
experimenter’s rule was the standard ‘any ascending 
numbers’ rule. Participants were not required to generate the 
hypothesis themselves. Instead, they were asked to test 
Peter’s hypothesis. 
   This task allowed us to control the precise relationship 
between the hypothesis under test and the truth (the 
experimenter’s rule).  The task allows us to give participants 
a low quality hypothesis. It must be falsified using negative 
falsifying tests in order to discover the truth. The low 
quality hypothesis ‘even numbers ascending in twos’ is 
embedded within the truth ‘any ascending numbers’. 
Because the hypothesis is less general than the true rule, 
participants must falsify to find out that it is not the true 
rule.        
    The embedded relationship between a hypothesis and the 
experimenter’s rule may influence a participant’s potential 
to falsify. The embedded situation is one of five possible 
relationships that can exist between a participant’s 
hypothesis and an experimenter’s rule (Klayman & Ha, 
1987). The relationships concern how much the 
participant’s hypothesis and the experimenter’s rule overlap 
with one another. Three relationships are relevant to our 
experiments.   
     The first relationship, outlined in Figure 1 (a), is the 
embedded relationship characteristic of the 2-4-6 task. The 
rule is ‘any ascending numbers’ and the participant’s 
hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’. We 
adopted this situation for our imaginary participant 2-4-6 
task. Participant’s were  given ‘even numbers ascending in 
twos’ as Peter’s hypothesis and the experimenter’s rule they 
had to discover was ‘any ascending numbers’. The only way 
to intentionally falsify is to use a negative falsifying test.  
For example, consider a participant who generates the triple 
5-10-15 (which is a negative test as ascending in five or odd 
numbers is inconsistent with Peter’s hypothesis ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’).  They expect it to be 
consistent with the true rule. They will receive a ‘yes’ from 
the experimenter, because 5-10-15 is consistent with ‘any 
ascending numbers’. They can infer that Peter’s hypothesis 
about ‘evenness’ or ‘ascending in twos’ cannot be true. It is 
not possible to falsify the hypothesis by generating a 
positive falsifying test.   
   Consider a participant who tries to falsify by generating 
the positive falsifying test, 24-26-28 (which is a positive test 
because it is consistent with Peter’s hypothesis ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’, but they expect it to be 
inconsistent with the true rule). When they receive a ‘yes’ 
from the experimenter they cannot infer that Peter’s 
hypothesis pertaining to properties of ‘evenness’ or 
‘ascending in twos’ is untrue. Although the positive test 
intended to falsify, it cannot. It is consistent with both the 
hypothesis and the true rule.  
In the second type of embedded relationship,  illustrated 
in Figure 1 (b), the participant’s hypothesis is more general 
than the true rule. Consider a case where Peter’s hypothesis 
is ‘numbers ascending in twos’ and the true rule is ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’. The true rule  is embedded 
within Peter’s hypothesis. It is possible to falsify by 
generating a positive falsifying test. A participant may 
generate the triple 3-5-7 (which is a positive test as it is 
consistent with the hypothesis ‘ascending in twos’), but they 
expect that it is not consistent with the true rule. This time 
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they receive a ‘no’ from the experimenter, because 3-5-7 
contains odd numbers. They can infer that the hypothesis is 
not the rule because it may pertain to numbers with the 
property of ‘evenness’. Now consider a participant who tries 
to falsify by generating a negative falsifying test such as 5-
10-15. This time when they receive a ‘no’ from the 
experimenter they may not infer that Peter’s hypothesis 
‘numbers ascending in twos’ is untrue. The triple is 
inconsistent with their hypothesis and the true rule and so it 
cannot discriminate between them (Klayman & Ha, 1987).   
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Three relationships between Peter’s hypothesis 
and the true rule  in  the 2-4-6  Task 
 
The third situation, illustrated in Figure 1 (c),   is when 
the hypothesis is the same as the true rule, for example, 
Peter’s hypothesis ‘any ascending numbers’  completely 
overlaps the true rule ‘any ascending numbers’. When a 
participant generates a positive test triple such as 24-26-28, 
even if it is intended to falsify,  it receives a ‘yes’ response. 
The test leads to confirmation. And negative test triples such 
as 6-4-2 receive a ‘no’ response (because descending 
numbers are not consistent with the true rule ‘any ascending 
numbers’). When a descending triple receives a ‘no’ it does 
not help the participant infer that their hypothesis ‘any 
ascending numbers’ is certainly the true rule.  It is not 
possible to falsify a true hypothesis.   
 
Experiment 1 
The aim of the experiment was to test whether people can 
falsify hypotheses consistently (see Cowley and Byrne, 
2005). We gave participants a version of the 2-4-6 task with 
the crucial difference that their task was to test someone 
else’s hypothesis. We presented some of them with an 
alternative hypothesis in addition to the hypothesis to be 
tested, in that we told some of them not only about Peter’s 
hypothesis but also about the experimenter’s rule. In so 
doing, we placed participants in a superior knowledge state 
much like a teacher who must present a counterexample to a 
student in order to show the student that a hypothesis is 
inaccurate. Participants must falsify and announce that Peter 
will know from this evidence that his hypothesis is 
inaccurate. Participants falsifying under these conditions can 
show they understand the implication of the test result if 
they  demonstrate they intend to falsify. 
    The participants were sixty four members of the general 
public who volunteered and were paid a nominal fee, or who 
were undergraduate students and participated for course 
credits. There were 50 women and 14 men whose ages 
ranged from 15 years to 73 years, with a mean age of 35 
years. No participants had taken courses in the philosophy 
of science.  
    They were assigned at random to one of four groups (n = 
16 in each). They were told that an individual called Peter 
was asked to discover a rule that a researcher had in mind, 
to which the number sequence 2-4-6 conforms. Two of the 
groups were told that Peter hypothesises the rule to be ‘even 
numbers ascending in twos’ (a low quality hypothesis). One 
of these groups was told what the experimenter’s rule was 
(‘any ascending numbers’), and so they knew the hypothesis 
was a low-quality one, and the other group was not told 
what the experimenter’s rule was. The other two groups 
were told that Peter’s hypothesis is ‘any ascending numbers’ 
(a high quality hypothesis).   Again, one group was told the 
experimenter’s rule (‘any ascending numbers’), and the 
other group was not. Participants in all four groups, low 
quality known, low quality unknown, high quality known 
and high quality unknown, were instructed to generate 
number triples of their own. They had to test Peter’s 
hypothesis in such a way as to help him discover if his rule 
was the experimenter’s rule (for further details see Cowley 
and Byrne, 2005).  
    Participants were tested individually and they recorded 
their number triples on a recording sheet which had five 
columns in which they wrote the triple, their reason for 
choosing the triple, whether they expected the triple to 
conform to Peter’s hypothesis (i.e., is it a positive or 
negative test), whether they expected the triple to conform 
to the experimenter’s rule (i.e.,   did they intend to confirm 
or falsify). In the last column the experimenter (the first 
author) wrote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as to whether or not the triple did 
in fact conform to the rule. They were asked to announce 
when they were highly confident if their triples would show 
Peter if his rule was the experimenter’s rule. 
 
Results  
The results show that people can consistently falsify 
hypotheses. In the low quality known condition, Peter’s 
hypothesis is a low quality embedded one,  ‘even numbers 
ascending in twos’ and the participants know that the rule to 
be discovered is in fact ‘any ascending numbers’. 
Participants found it possible to falsify in this condition. 
90% of their tests were falsifying ones.  One example of a 
negative falsifying test triple generated by one of the 
participants in this condition was: 15-17-19. They said they 
expected 15-17-19 not to be an instance of the hypothesis 
they were testing (even numbers ascending in twos) yet they 
expected it to conform to the experimenter’s rule (any 
ascending numbers). Each participant produced at least one 
negative falsifying test and more negative falsifying tests 
were generated in this condition than in any of the other 
conditions, low quality unknown (22%),  high quality 
known, (0%),  and high quality unknown (6%, chi2 = 18.325 
(1), p < .0001). Table 2 presents the percentages of each test 
type for all conditions.  
 
 
Peter’s H 
True Rule 
 
Peter’s H 
True Rule 
 
Peter’s H 
True Rule
(a) (b) (c) 
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Table 2: Percentages of hypothesis test types generated in 
each condition of experiment 1. 
 
            Low quality        High quality 
            Known   Unknown         Known   Unknown 
  _______________________________________________ 
 
 Confirming  
      Positive  6 61          86       72 
      Negative  4  9          14         8 
 
Falsifying 
      Positive  0  8           0         14 
      Negative 90 22           0           6 
  _______________________________________________ 
 
The result that 90% of the triples that participants generated 
were negative falsifying hypothesis tests shows that people 
can indeed falsify in some circumstances. What aspect of 
the low quality known condition facilitates falsification? 
One possibility is that people have a tendency to falsify 
someone else’s hypothesis rather than one’s own. Often,  
real life scientific hypothesis testing proceeds by attempting 
to falsify another scientist’s hypothesis. Our second 
experiment tested whether people tend to falsify other 
people’s hypotheses more than their own.   
Experiment 2 
The experiment was designed to discover whether 
participants falsify a low quality hypothesis when it 
belonged to someone else compared to when it belonged to 
themselves. Thirty two people who were members of the 
general public volunteered and were paid a nominal fee. 
There were 23 women and 9 men. Their ages ranged from 
20 years to 75 years, with a mean age of 51 years. No 
participants had taken courses in the philosophy of science.  
    There were two conditions. In one condition the low 
quality embedded hypothesis was identified as belonging to 
the ‘imaginary participant’ Peter. Participants were told that 
Peter’s hypothesis is ‘even numbers ascending in twos’.  In 
the other condition the identical hypothesis was identified as 
belonging to the participant. Participants were told that 
‘your hypothesis is even numbers ascending in twos’. 
Participants were not told what the experimenter’s rule was 
in either condition. The recording sheet and procedure were 
the same as in experiment 1.   
 
Results  
Participants tended to falsify a hypothesis belonging to 
someone else more often than the same hypothesis 
belonging to themselves. Participants who tested Peter’s 
hypothesis generated more negative falsifying tests than 
participants who tested their own hypothesis (32% versus 
7%), although the difference was not reliable (chi2 = 2.667 
(4), p = .307), as Table 3 shows.     
 
 
Table 3: Percentage of hypothesis test types generated in  
each condition of experiment 2. 
 
      Peter’s   Self 
      hypothesis hypothesis  
   _____________________________________________ 
 
   Confirming 
 Positive  46  67 
 Negative 14  17 
 
   Falsifying 
 Positive    8    9 
 Negative 32    7 
   _____________________________________________ 
 
Participants could abandon  the hypothesis, that is, they 
announced that the hypothesis was not the researcher’s rule 
when they had finished testing triples, or they could endorse 
it, that is, they  announced that the hypothesis was the 
researcher’s rule when they had finished testing triples. 
Participants tended to abandon the low quality hypothesis 
rather than endorse it when it was Peter’s hypothesis (62% 
versus 38%); in contrast, they tended to endorse the low 
quality hypothesis rather than abandon it when it was their 
own    (75% versus 25%), as Table 4 shows. The difference 
was reliable (chi2 = 4.571 (1), p = .016). 
 
Table 4: Percentages of abandoned and endorsed hypotheses 
in each condition of experiment 2. 
 
  Peter’s   Own 
      hypothesis hypothesis  
  _____________________________________________ 
     
    Abandoned hypothesis 62  25 
     
    Endorsed hypothesis 38  75  
   _____________________________________________ 
 
The results suggest that people falsify a hypothesis 
belonging to someone else more often and use the falsifying 
evidence to abandon a low quality hypothesis belonging to 
someone else more often than their own equally low quality 
hypothesis.  
Conclusion 
Our experiments demonstrate that people can consistently 
engage in falsification, that is, they can generate negative 
tests that genuinely falsify a hypothesis. They can falsify in 
the most difficult hypothesis testing situations, that is, when 
the hypothesis is low quality and it is embedded within the 
true rule. They falsified with the intention that their chosen 
tests would falsify. They appear to be aware of the 
implications of their test choice because they announced 
that the imaginary participant would realize from the test 
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results that a hypothesis was low quality (pace Poletiek, 
1996).  
   The experiments suggest that people can falsify other 
people’s hypotheses more readily than their own even 
without knowledge that the hypothesis is low quality or 
knowledge about what the relationship between the 
hypothesis and the truth is (pace Klayman & Ha, 1989). 
They tended not to abandon a low quality hypothesis when 
it was their own, compared to when it belonged to someone 
else. Participants may be able to rely on a falsification 
strategy in a rational way to test somebody else’s hypothesis 
but not their own. We are currently examining the role of 
alternative hypotheses in helping people to falsify (Cowley 
and Byrne, 2005).  
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